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Introduction
In 2012, the Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) describes itself as being 
in a period of transition, or change, as it enters 
its next phase. The appropriateness of the timing 
for this transition, as well as the plans for the 
transition, is considered in this paper.
In September 2011, the UN Secretary General, 
Ban Ki-moon, made a historic visit to Solomon 
Islands. It was only the second visit by a serving 
UN Secretary General to the Pacific Islands, 
and the first ever to Solomon Islands. His visit 
included a meeting with members of RAMSI, 
during which views were exchanged on the 
challenges of peacekeeping missions. Discussion 
centred on the two principal risks: the risk of 
leaving too soon, and the risk of staying too long. 
Too soon would be characterised by a return to 
violence, or at least to the systematic demanding 
(with menace) of compensation. Too late would 
be characterised by a dependency on donors, 
a lack of national self-confidence, and a self-
interested political elite operating on the basis that 
responsibility for the core functions of government 
— law and justice, economic management and 
the machinery of government — is conveniently 
subcontracted to outsiders.
Even when we have regard to these risks, the 
timing of RAMSI’s transition is a matter of fine 
judgement; separate judgements have been made 
about its civilian, police and military components. 
These judgements, and the implications for 
RAMSI’s next phase (2013–17), will be described 
in the second half of this paper. The first half 
will assess the extent to which the factors that 
contributed to the tensions have been addressed.
Is Solomon Islands ready for RAMSI’s transi-
tion? In early April 2012, rumours spread briefly 
but quickly in Honiara of a return to tensions-era 
conflict. The rumours were that members of the 
Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM, the Guale mili-
tant group during the 1998–2003 period of civil 
unrest) were threatening to chase out Malaitans in 
communities around the Guadalcanal plains.
These rumours were quickly dispelled. The 
5 April 2012 Solomon Star cover story reported 
that former IFM and Malaita Eagle Forces (MEF) 
members had issued a joint statement denouncing 
the rumours as false. A spokesman from the former 
IFM was quoted as saying ‘we want to assure 
the people in this nation that nothing as such is 
going on’. A former MEF member was quoted as 
saying ‘former MEF militants have no intention to 
regroup’. A photograph of former members of both 
groups standing together accompanied the article 
(Marau 2012). 
What the rumours show is not so much 
the fragility of the peace, but the fragility of 
confidence. The willingness of so many people to 
believe the rumours and accept that tension-era 
behaviour could return is one reason why most 
Solomon Islanders want RAMSI to stay. 
The People’s Survey 2011 surveyed around 
5,000 adults — more than one per cent of the 
entire adult population — and it shows that only 
19 per cent of those surveyed thought Solomon 
Islands was ready for RAMSI to scale back its 
activities, and 86 per cent supported the presence 
of RAMSI. Focus group discussions sought to get 
a better understanding of why people supported 
RAMSI and wanted RAMSI to stay. In 2011, for 
the first time, they were asked ‘What more does 
RAMSI need to do before it is ready to leave?’. 
The range of responses covered both social needs 
and infrastructure requirements. According to the 
Survey, it included some suggestions that reflected 
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a lack of understanding of RAMSI’s mandate. 
In addition to wanting RAMSI to maintain law 
and order, some discussants wanted RAMSI to 
resolve land disputes, build more schools and 
clinics, provide financial assistance to rural people, 
and provide advice to farmers. The focus group 
discussions reflect a very mixed understanding of 
RAMSI’s mandate and work program and, with 
the range and depth of socioeconomic challenges 
facing Solomon Islands, it is not surprising that 
respondents see RAMSI as their best chance for 
addressing these and favour RAMSI’s continued 
presence (ANU Enterprise 2012, 93–96).
RAMSI, however, is not the ideal means 
for assisting the Solomon Islands Government 
address the full range of development challenges 
facing the country: it is a short-term intervention, 
while development challenges require long-term 
assistance; its mandate is limited and was never 
intended to cover all of the major challenges that 
the nation faces today; and it is an expensive model 
of assistance. The more relevant consideration is 
whether RAMSI has fulfilled its original mandate.
RAMSI’S Mandate 
RAMSI’s mandate was initially outlined in the  
Framework for Strengthened Assistance to  
Solomon Islands: Proposed Scope and Require-
ments, a document that was provided to prime 
minister Sir Allan Kemakeza on 5 June 2003 (SIG 
2003a). This document constitutes the ‘package of 
strengthened assistance’ that was endorsed by  
Pacific Islands Forum foreign ministers on 30 June  
2003 and discussed in the Solomon Islands cabinet, 
and also between the cabinet and a high-level 
delegation of Australian officials (all before RAMSI 
arrived). The Frame-work was subsequently incor-
porated in the publicly released Solomon Islands 
Government Policy Statement on the Offer by the  
Government of Australia for Strengthened Assist-
ance to Solomon Islands 2003 (SIG 2003a). The 
mandate covered both civil order and the economy.
Under civil order, the main task was to 
re-establish security in Honiara, enabling 
government, business and the community to 
operate free of intimidation. Improved security 
would then be extended beyond Honiara. Key 
elements were to:
•	 reform the RSIPF, introduce expatriate police 
personnel into line positions and provide 
increased resources
•	 launch a new effort to locate and confiscate 
illegal weapons
•	 investigate and prosecute new criminal offences 
vigorously
•	 strengthen the courts and prison system, protect 
key institutions, such as the finance ministry, 
courts and their personnel from intimidation.
The first task in relation to the economy was 
to stabilise government finances and balance the 
budget. The key elements were to:
•	 secure revenue collection and control outlays
•	 strengthen administrative safeguards in 
government financial systems, including by 
deploying expatriate personnel in key positions
•	 obtain donor, international financial institution 
and technical support.
The second economy-related task was to 
promote longer term economic recovery and 
revive business confidence, building on better civil 
order and the stabilisation of government finances. 
In this regard, the Framework said it would be 
important to pursue economic reform policies 
to regain credibility with the international donor 
community, and to rebuild the essential machinery 
of government to support stability and the delivery 
of services. There was to be a focus on dealing with 
corruption, a cleansing of the government payroll 
and improved debt management.
This mandate was closely linked to Solomon 
Islands’ national priorities, which were reaffirmed 
in 2003 in the National Economic Recovery, 
Reform and Development Plan 2003–2006 
(SIG 2003). While the mandate has remained 
unchanged, the focus of RAMSI’s activities has 
evolved in tandem with changes in the country 
context. The focus of RAMSI’s activities has been 
developed over the years and, particularly since 
2007, in extensive consultation with Solomon 
Islands Government officials and ministers and 
other stakeholders. The RAMSI Medium Term 
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Strategy 2007 (RAMSI 2007) and the Partnership 
Framework Between Solomon Islands Government 
and Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands (endorsed by the Pacific Islands Forum 
Ministerial Standing Committee on 15 May 2009), 
thereby also helped define RAMSI’s mandate (SIG 
and RAMSI 2009). These documents were self-
characterised as intending to be flexible or ‘living’ 
documents, responsive and adaptable to changing 
circumstances.
The Causes
It is not the purpose of this paper to provide a 
comprehensive survey of the literature on the 
causes of ‘the tensions’. However, some general 
understanding of the causes is necessary in a 
discussion of the timing of RAMSI’s drawdown. It 
could be argued that in addition to re-establishing 
security, RAMSI should ensure that the set of 
circumstances that caused the Solomon Islands 
Government to seek external assistance will not 
present themselves again.
The literature identifies a range of so-called 
underlying causes of the 1998–2003 tensions. In 
a report that proved to be a catalyst for action, 
Wainwright attributed the civil unrest of that 
period to ‘introduced institutions of the modern 
nation-state’ that had been ‘overlaid on top of a 
multiplicity of indigenous political structures’. She 
argued that the crisis in Solomon Islands was less 
about the collapse of a coherent, functioning state, 
and more about ‘the unravelling of the apparatus 
of colonial rule’ (Wainwright 2003). Moore (2004) 
argues that the causes are principally related to 
inequitable economic and political development, 
and to ethnic tensions or separate insurgency. 
According to Moore, economic downturn was a 
substantial factor in the violence of 1998–2003, 
but must be viewed alongside political ineptitude, 
corruption and manipulation, and the long-term 
consequences of unequal development on Malaita 
and Guadalcanal.
Fraenkel argues that high population growth, a 
stagnant economy and weak social services ‘fostered 
the emergence of a footloose, underemployed 
generation that had little loyalty to the established 
order. Land disputes on Guadalcanal associated with 
a large-scale influx of migrants from Malaita added 
to this potential for instability’(Fraenkel 2004, 10). 
However, he assesses that these factors alone do not 
explain the social and political crisis of 1998–2003. 
He argues that during the timber export boom 
of the 1990s, a culture of cronyism took hold of 
Honiara’s political elite, benefiting the insiders and 
their wantoks, but marginalising outsiders. Fraenkel 
concludes that it was ‘fading politicians in Honiara 
and their methods for seeking redress for what were 
often genuinely felt and readily comprehensible 
popular grievances that were ultimately responsible 
for the plundering, internal discrediting and 
withering away of the Solomon Islands state’. 
Fraenkel says the Guadalcanal and Malaitan 
militants were ‘stage-armies used by marginalised 
elites in pursuit of political and financial objectives, 
both rallied a disenchanted and under-employed 
generation to serve as the rank-and-file and  
both unleashed forces that proved subsequently 
difficult, even ultimately impossible domestically,  
to control’ (Fraenkel 2004, 79–80).
Braithwaite et al. (2010, 18–19, 113, 128–129), 
drawing on previous research and their own 
extensive research, note that the problem in 
Solomon Islands was ‘not only slow development, 
but resentment over uneven development. The 
people of Guadalcanal came to view Malaitans as 
disrespectful guests on their land.’ They identified ‘a 
failure of land law combined with rapid population 
growth putting pressure on land’ as one root cause 
of the conflict. The displacement of Malaitans was ‘a 
grievance rooted in the failure of Solomons land law 
to give them certainty of tenure on leased land’.  
Resentments over the scramble between different 
ethnic groups for very limited employment oppor-
tunities in the formal economy were also a root 
cause. In some parts of the country during the period 
of the tensions, it was ‘a society that had a virulent 
problem of violent organised criminal gangs’.
According to Braithwaite et al., the proximate 
factors in the conflict were ‘the actions of certain 
politicians who, recognising how deep were the 
structural factors … and how deeply felt were the 
grievances associated with them, sought political 
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advantage by encouraging a politics of ethnic 
resentment’. For their part, young men ‘mostly 
joined up to defend their people, but prospects 
of excitement and loot for unemployed youth 
were probably in the mix’. And a history of 
compensation payouts by the state to those who 
threatened violence based on ethnic grievance 
‘possibly made both mobilisations more attractive 
ploys than they otherwise might have been’.
Allen (2011) identifies an important struc-
tural cause of the conflict as the spatial inequal-
ity in socioeconomic opportunities brought about 
by longstanding patterns of uneven development 
and, related to that, the migration of people from 
the densely populated and historically undevel-
oped island of Malaita to Honiara and its environs. 
Other structural factors identified include: the 
weakness and widely perceived illegitimacy of the 
postcolonial state; the ongoing strength of localism 
and corollary calls for greater devolution and pro-
vincial autonomy; the presence of large numbers of 
poorly educated and underemployed young men; 
and the chronic instability, and close ties with the 
corrupt logging industry that have characterised 
national-level politics since independence.
Allen argues that the expected collapse of 
the logging industry by 2015 will place pressure 
on local patronage networks and exacerbate 
existing socioeconomic grievances, thereby partly 
recreating conditions that contributed to the 
original outbreak of violence in the late 1990s. And 
other economic developments, such as mining, will 
further entrench historical patterns of inequality. 
He concludes that RAMSI will need to provide 
a ‘security guarantee’ for the next 10–15 years to 
create the space for local, home-grown processes 
that have the best potential to address some of 
the underlying causes of the conflict. It should be 
noted that this call for RAMSI to provide a security 
guarantee is a stronger undertaking than envisaged 
in RAMSI’s mandate, which was to restore security.
The drivers of conflict described in the 
academic literature on Solomon Islands are not 
dissimilar to the factors identified by the World 
Bank as present in most of the world’s conflicts. 
The World Development Report 2011 notes that 
a perceived (as much as a real) sense of social 
injustice and exclusion, whether in respect of 
security, services or economic outcomes, is the 
common cross country theme driving violent 
conflict (World Bank 2011, 82).
Solomon Islands Today
Some of the causes of, or factors contributing to the 
tensions have been addressed. With assistance from 
RAMSI and its Participating Police Force (PPF), 
the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) 
has been cleaned out and rebuilt, and law and 
justice is being delivered — certainly for the more 
serious offences . The widespread demanding (with 
menace) of compensation has stopped and the 
breakdown of government systems and processes 
has been rectified. And, also with the benefit of 
considerable assistance from RAMSI, the country’s 
finances are now back in shape, much debt has 
been paid off and the economy is growing strongly. 
Reforms in telecommunications, state-owned 
enterprises and public finance management are 
seeing improved service delivery. 
Today, with donor support, there is an 
improved capacity in the Solomon Islands 
Government to deliver services. That is, the 
apparatus of government which one study said had 
‘unravelled’ has largely been rebuilt; the economy 
that was stagnant is booming; the social services 
that were very weak have improved; and the culture 
of cronyism, while an ongoing challenge, has been 
curtailed somewhat and is no longer so blatant.
Some reconciliation among former tension 
militants and between militants and victims has 
taken place and more is continuing. The Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission has completed 
its five-volume, 1,500 page report. It remains to 
be seen what will become of it and whether it will 
achieve widespread and true reconciliation. True 
reconciliation puts an end to residual tension 
between parties and enables both sides to ‘move 
on’. It can play a very important role in Solomon 
Islands culture and society.
The removal of weapons from the community 
is one of RAMSI’s early and most significant 
achievements. During its first year, RAMSI 
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collected and destroyed some 3,700 weapons and 
over 300,000 ammunition rounds. This represents 
between 90 and 95 per cent of all the weapons 
stolen from police armouries. Some weapons 
remain unaccounted for: they could be stashed 
away or buried, maybe out of a fear at the time that, 
notwithstanding RAMSI’s arrival, they might be 
needed in the future; they could have been traded 
into Papua New Guinea or to loggers; or they could 
have been disposed of by owners who failed to 
comply with the initial amnesty and subsequently 
feared the consequences. We will never be able to 
account for every missing weapon, but we can say 
Solomon Islands today is close to weapons-free 
compared with the tensions period, when weapons 
were the lingua franca of those possessed by greed 
or grievance. 
More important than the number of weapons 
in the community is the incidence of crimes 
involving the use of firearms. If there were 
weapons readily available and functioning in the 
community, especially if held by former militants, 
we should expect evidence of weapons being used 
for hunting, killing crocodiles or in the commission 
of crime. At the very least, we would expect some 
former militants, disgruntled at the absence of 
compensation payments or the non-fulfilment of 
some favourable clause in the Townsville Peace 
Agreement, to use or hire out their weapons.1
But we don’t. In both relative and real terms, 
Solomon Islands has an extremely low rate of crime 
involving the use of firearms. Since RAMSI’s arrival 
on 24 July 2003 up until the end of January 2013, 
there have been only eleven confirmed reports of 
incidents involving firearms.2 This is highly unusual 
for a post-conflict society. In other post-conflict 
jurisdictions, one of the major challenges is that 
large quantities of weapons typically remain in 
communities, and in use. 
Unfinished Business
Some of the factors that contributed to the tensions 
remain present. Clearly, the ‘poorly designed 
institutions of statehood’, although no longer 
‘unravelling’, remain in place. There is ongoing 
discussion of constitutional change, but no clear 
consensus yet on a path forward. It is hard to 
measure the level of discontent that might be 
caused by the system of government introduced in 
1978. The Solomon Islands’ model of government 
is similar to other postcolonial parliamentary 
democracies. The peaceful experience of these 
newly independent countries is evidence that 
there is no automaticity or linear relationship 
between the introduction of a new, alien system 
of government and community and political 
breakdown leading to internal disorder.
Inequitable economic development also 
remains, and seems stronger than ever. Honiara 
and its environs are booming and Gizo, Munda 
and Noro are doing well. However, there is little 
evidence of broad-based economic development, 
including on the isolated Weather Coast of 
Guadalcanal. Economic growth in Malaita Province 
is unlikely to be strong enough to stop Malaitans 
emigrating for work. Auki, the largest town in the 
country’s second most populous province (SIG 
2012),3 has a new market and a new jetty, both of 
which will contribute to economic development 
by providing better livelihood opportunities for 
farmers and middlemen, and lowering the cost 
of doing business. Both projects were delayed 
for years by land disputes. The airport for Auki 
(Gwanaru’u airport) was closed for over a year 
from June 2011 for similar reasons, and the 
planned construction by RAMSI of much-needed 
new police houses has also been delayed for many 
years because of an inability to find a suitable 
and uncontested area of land. The contesting of 
land ownership and use is the main obstacle to 
development, and yet land is the key ingredient 
in broad-based or village-based economic 
development. It is hard to imagine where growth 
will come from, other than through higher valued 
uses of land. That is the quandary.
On much of the Weather Coast, economic 
opportunities are more limited than in other parts 
of the country, largely for geographic and demo-
graphic reasons. The access by communities to gov-
ernment services, and some commercial opportu-
nities, would be enhanced by better road transport 
along the coast. The terrain, including the large 
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number of river crossings, makes this a difficult 
and expensive undertaking. Notwithstanding the 
difficulty, it is important that feelings of isolation 
and neglect are addressed for Solomon Islands to 
avoid another cry for attention from the impover-
ished residents of the Weather Coast.
Unequal economic growth seems likely to be 
an enduring feature of Solomon Islands. However, 
this doesn’t mean militancy will return. Unequal 
economic development is a fact of life in all econo-
mies, including among Australian states today. 
Indeed, most economic growth in low income 
economies comes from the movement of resources 
(primarily people) from low productivity uses to 
higher productivity uses — from subsistence agri-
culture to employment in the towns and cities. 
It is axiomatic that growth will be unequal, and 
this will generate social pressures. What is most 
important is that there is strong national income 
growth, that the government captures a share of 
the rising national income, and uses its enhanced 
resources to deliver services throughout the coun-
try (‘horizontal fiscal equalisation’ in the language 
of economists). The efficient and effective delivery 
of services throughout the country is important 
for its own sake, and to alleviate feelings of social 
injustice and exclusion.
The Movement of People
The movement of people primarily from Malaita 
Province to Guadalcanal Province in search of 
employment is often identified as one of the caus-
es of the tensions, and has led many to label them 
as ‘ethnic tensions’. Unskilled work in Honiara and 
in the oil palm plantations on the Guadalcanal 
plains added to the attraction of internal migra-
tion. Malaitans, in particular, have a longstanding 
experience of travelling for work and remitting 
funds to their families. From the late 19th century, 
most of the labour on the copra and the oil palm 
plantations in Solomon Islands was from Malaita. 
Guale people’s resentment grew at the success 
of the Malaitans in getting jobs in government, 
the RSIPF and in the oil palm plantations east of 
Honiara. On Guadalcanal, this became a source of 
resentment, particularly by the Guale people who 
considered Malaitans to be aggressive and domi-
nating the economic opportunities in Honiara.
The purchase or occupation of land on 
Guadalcanal by Malaitans fuelled this resentment. 
So too did the acquisition of land through 
marriage (Guadalcanal is traditionally matrilineal 
and Malaita patrilineal, so a Malaitan man who 
marries a Guale woman acquires land through 
both channels, while a Guale man who marries a 
Malaitan woman has no land rights) (Braithwaite 
et al. 2010, 19). This resentment made it easy for 
politicians and militants to manipulate Guale 
communities for their own advantage. And 
when more than 20,000 mostly Malaitans were 
displaced from the Guadalcanal plains with 
violence and without assistance for repatriations or 
compensation, many young Malaitans identified 
readily with calls to defend themselves (Fraenkel 
2004, 55 and Braithwaite 2010, 35).
Ethnic differences are a characteristic of 
Solomons’ society. With at least 64 living languages 
of many dialects (Tryon and Hackman 1993), 
nine provinces plus Honiara City, six large islands 
and hundreds of others, and identity traditionally 
centred around one’s extended family or village, 
it is difficult to build a strong and unified 
sense of national identity. Most of the country 
is Melanesian, but there are also Polynesian, 
Gilbertese, Chinese and European peoples with 
differences evident in linguistic diversity and 
physical appearance. Even within a province, such 
as Malaita, there are distinct communities with a 
sense of ethnic difference. 
That said, for the most part, Solomon Islanders 
from different provinces (and different parts 
of a province) live and work together amicably. 
This is especially evident in Honiara and among 
politicians, many of whom marry women from 
another province (possibly resulting from time 
together at high school or university). Almost half 
the members of parliament are married to a woman 
from another province, and half the permanent 
secretaries have a partner from another province.4 
This suggests a well-integrated society, at least at 
the all-important leadership level, and one not 
defined by the visceral hatred of the neighbours 
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seen in countries with volatile ethnic tensions.
The People’s Survey 2011 asked respondents 
what the main causes of conflict and problems were 
in Solomon Islands today. By far the most common 
response was land disputes (61 per cent), followed 
by alcohol and drugs (40 per cent) and arguments 
outside and within the family (21 per cent). The 
Survey commented that ‘it is notable that less 
than 10% mentioned tension between ethnic and 
provincial groups, migration or illegal settlement’ 
(ANU Enterprise 2012, 90).
While linguistic and ethnic diversity are 
permanent features of Solomon Islands (as they are 
elsewhere in the Pacific), they are not manifesting 
themselves today in serious ethnic tensions. 
Today there is not the concentration of Malaitan 
employees on the Guadalcanal plains that was 
evident in the 1990s. Nevertheless, diversity in 
Solomon Islands remains exploitable (including 
against Chinese businesses). It is this — the 
exploitability of the people and the willingness 
of some people to exploit others — and not 
ethnicity per se that means we cannot permanently 
rule out future civil disorder. The significance 
of provincial identity is that it creates a prism 
through which events are viewed, increasing the 
risk of discrimination and the misinterpretation, 
manipulation and escalation of events.
Internal migration and Honiara’s urbanisation 
are both likely to continue. Honiara’s population 
reduced markedly during the tensions, but with 
the arrival of RAMSI in 2003 many returned and 
the population of Honiara and its environs grew 
sharply. It is difficult to be precise about the pace 
of Honiara’s urbanisation. The National Census 
doesn’t capture yearly changes, and part of the 
population of Honiara — those who reside outside 
the boundaries of Honiara City Council — is 
counted in the figure for Guadalcanal Province. 
However, if we add the population of urban 
Guadalcanal to the population of Honiara city we 
get a population for greater Honiara of over 80,000 
in 2009 (SIG 2012, Sect.A, Tble 1). 
The growth of Honiara and its peri-urban 
settlements, especially at White River (two 
kilometres west of Honiara’s central business 
district) and Burns Creek (10 kilometres east of 
Honiara’s central business district) present their own 
set of challenges. The settlements, where much of 
the population growth is concentrated, have limited 
or uneven access to town water, sanitation, grid 
power and sealed roads. Land tenure arrangements 
are mixed, although most settlement communities 
have either settled illegally on alienated lands, or 
on crown land reserved for common use. Many 
Honiara settlement residents are Malaitan migrants. 
The People’s Survey 2011 notes that:
In urban settlement communities around 
Honiara built on unregistered land, people are 
often in conflict with the governments and 
with the original land owners. These squatters 
are likely to become involved in further dis-
putes over the use of garden land, expanding 
boundaries of the urban slums and harvesting 
resources without permission. Some of these 
disputes may be internal to the settlement, as 
well as with outside groups. These issues are 
aggravated by population increase and the 
internal migration of residents of outer prov-
inces who come to Honiara in search of work, 
medical care or education. Overcrowding also 
contributes to internal family conflicts  
(ANU Enterprise 2012, 92).
People in most rural areas exist through 
subsistence agriculture and make a small cash 
income on the side, sufficient only for basic needs. 
The lack of services, remoteness, and limited 
economic and social opportunities result in people 
choosing to move to Honiara to have better access 
to health and education services, more skilled and 
better paid work and economic opportunity.
Honiara is the principal point of entry for those 
leaving the land and the existence of family and 
village networks facilitates a chain migration path. 
The presence of wantoks in greater Honiara provides 
a basis for survival after arrival, and connections 
that for some become a pathway to employment and 
income. Urbanisation is happening, notwithstanding 
government polices — such as regional growth 
centres — designed to reduce the push from rural 
areas. The limited provision of basic services to 
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Honiara’s settlements is also accepted as it is feared 
that a better functioning Honiara would only make 
the capital more attractive.
The recent influx of people into Honiara needs 
to be managed and planned because urbanisation 
is an opportunity. The World Bank’s World 
Development Report 2009 concluded that the most 
effective route to poverty reduction and economic 
growth is to encourage the highest possible urban 
population density through migration, provided 
there is an accompanying strong investment in 
services and infrastructure (World Bank 2009). 
The concentration of people in urban areas such as 
Honiara lowers the per capita cost of basic service 
provision.
The movement of outsiders onto Guale land, 
resentment at their success and presence, and 
the manipulation of those feelings for political 
or personal gain were among the main strands 
in the tangle of causes of the tensions. Measures 
to stop the movement of people are unlikely to 
be successful (unless draconian) and this makes 
the management of urbanisation an essential 
ingredient in efforts to minimise the possibility of 
a return to tensions. Acceptance and management 
of urbanisation distinguishes those cities that have 
prospered from the influx of people from those 
that become breeding grounds for violence and 
revolution (Saunders 2010).
Security Outlook
In the future, Solomon Islands is likely to 
experience further stress from the eventual 
decline in logging, continued unequal economic 
development, further urban drift, high levels of 
youth unemployment, and the proliferation of 
settlements in and around Honiara. These stresses 
are not dissimilar to the stresses experienced in 
many developed and developing countries. They, 
in themselves, do not signal the return to militancy 
and the civil unrest of the kind experienced in 
1998–2003. Today, there is no evidence of subversive 
ideology or ideologues, martyrs or militias, 
training camps or markets for weapons, and no 
organised mobilisation of people or resources 
intent on challenging the state. Nor are there large 
heroin, marijuana or other illicit drug markets, 
illicit gambling or prostitution markets that have 
attracted organised crime groups (Braithwaite 
2010, 128). The absence today of militant intent 
and capability and of organised crime is mostly a 
reflection of the state of Solomon’s society and the 
improved strength of its institutions. 
There is a significant difference between 
militant conflict and civil disorder, which can occur 
in the most ordered of countries — for example, 
Paris (2005), Sydney (2005), London (2011), Rome 
(2011), and Athens (2012). While the possibility 
of civil disorder in Solomon Islands cannot be 
ruled out, we can be more confident that militancy 
is much less likely as there is neither no longer 
evidence of it nor an appetite for it.
Today’s security challenges in Solomon Islands 
are about law and order. These include petty 
crime born out of poverty, corrupt practices born 
out of greed, and civil disorder that involves the 
easy mobilisation of vigorous young urban males 
impatient and bored with their destitution. In 
Solomon Islands, there is an ‘everyday’ (front-line) 
policing task, and a potential for spontaneous civil 
disorder, especially at times of political change. 
Both challenges call for a capable local police force 
— a force as capable as others in the Pacific.
How well is the RSIPF performing everyday 
policing and managing civil disorder? In The 
People’s Survey 2011, respondents said they sought 
help from the RSIPF for disturbances (38 per cent 
of the requests), violence or assault (28 per cent) 
and theft (26 per cent). Focus group discussion 
participants said that the main problems in com-
munities relate to alcohol consumption, including 
over-consumption of beer, home-brew, and the side  
effects of alcohol abuse, including domestic conflict, 
assaults, misuse of family money and disputes when 
families are left with no money to buy food. 
Forty-four per cent of respondents were 
satisfied with the help received from police and 
55 per cent said they were not satisfied. Most 
dissatisfaction was because the police did not do 
anything to help (82 per cent) or were too slow 
to respond (16 per cent). Twenty-four per cent of 
respondents thought the RSIPF had improved in 
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the past five years, while another 24 per cent said 
it had improved in some ways (40 per cent said 
it had not improved). Focus group discussion 
participants reported that police were unwilling to 
leave police posts. They said they were ineffective 
when they did, and village people, especially 
women and youth, were reluctant to report crimes 
to the police because they feared them. However, 
they also reveal that the community has a growing 
awareness that in many cases it’s the limited 
resources of the RSIPF that cause the police to fall 
short of community expectations. 
RSIPF officers interviewed for the survey 
provided more details of these constraints, 
emphasising just how discouraging it was to be 
unable, due to a lack of resources, to deliver the 
level of policing to which they aspire.
On the other hand, the recent performance of 
the RSIPF in handling major events has been very 
good. Crowds can mobilise quickly in Honiara, 
as they did on 16 November 2011, when Gordon 
Darcy Lilo was elected the nation’s new prime 
minister. A crowd of around 500–600 people, 
mainly young men, gathered around the Point 
Cruz area in the centre of town, moved towards 
the prime minister’s office, and then headed for 
the governor general’s residence in an attempt to 
prevent the swearing in of Mr Lilo. They carried 
makeshift banners demanding the prime minister-
elect’s resignation and stayed for several hours at 
Government House. There was a sizeable RSIPF 
presence at Government House and the crowd, 
while throwing the odd rock, remained largely 
under control. The crowd eventually split into 
groups, with one group moving to Lawson Tama 
stadium, where they started throwing rocks at 
police vehicles. This crowd was successfully 
dispersed by the RSIPF Police Response Team 
and RAMSI’s Operational Response Group, 
using a small quantity of CS gas (tear gas). The 
RSIPF continued to disperse other crowds and 
demonstrators throughout the afternoon. Later that 
day, Gordon Darcy Lilo proceeded to Government 
House and was sworn in as prime minister without 
incident. And parliament resumed the next 
morning, again without further incident.
The events around the election of the prime 
minister could have turned nasty very quickly. That 
they didn’t is the result of effective RSIPF policing, 
including high-visibility patrols, quick dispersal of 
crowds, control of key access points, and by working 
closely with community leaders. Aside from the 
rock throwing, most of the protestors were peaceful. 
There was no loss of life, no arson and no looting. 
Local journalist Koroi Hawkins witnessed the events 
first-hand. In a feature article in Islands Business  
he wrote:
The skill, professionalism, coordination and 
courage which the local officers displayed that 
day, ignited within me a spark of confidence 
in the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force and 
a glimmer of hope for the future of national 
security in my country Solomon Islands when 
RAMSI finally leaves our shores (Hawkins 2012).
The RSIPF also took the lead in planning and 
providing security during the Oceania Football 
Confederation Nations Cup5 (1–10 June 2012) and 
the Festival of Pacific Arts (1–14 July 2012). These 
were major public events involving large crowds of 
up to 26,000 people, both over a two-week period. 
Football games, wherever they occur in the world, 
have the potential for unruly and drunken behaviour 
and outbreaks of civil disorder. Notwithstanding the 
excitement of the games, visitors and the people of 
Solomon Islands were well behaved throughout the 
tournament and no arrests were made (Inifiri 2012). 
The Festival of Pacific Arts also saw the police 
manage security well, and saw a co-operative and 
well-behaved public.
The People’s Survey results and the handling 
of major events in Honiara in 2011 and 2012 (and 
the excellent job done by the RSIPF in delivering 
safe elections in 2010) suggest that there is a 
distinction between local- and national-level police 
performance. As is the case in many countries, the 
RSIPF struggles to deal adequately with issues such 
as domestic abuse and community disputes to the 
satisfaction of communities. These are particularly 
challenging tasks in a resource-constrained and 
geographically fragmented country such as Solomon 
Islands. The poor and uncertain presence of the 
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provincial court system is also contributing to the 
public not having full confidence in them at the 
provincial level. In contrast, we are now seeing 
increased confidence in national level policing 
and responses to major public order management 
incidents. Improved levels of confidence flow from 
observed improvements in performance. Honiara is 
the key to maintaining security in Solomon Islands, 
but improving police performance in the provinces 
will be key to building community confidence as 
measured in national surveys.
Maintaining the Peace
RAMSI has restored law and order, but has it 
also improved the chances of lasting peace? The 
experience from other peacekeeping missions is 
that peacekeeping missions do work to keep the 
peace. A recent study by Fortna (2008) identified a 
number of causal mechanisms through which the 
presence of peacekeepers might:
•	 change the incentives of recent belligerents, 
making peace more desirable or war more 
costly
•	 reduce the uncertainty and fear that drive 
security dilemma spirals
•	 prevent or control accidents or the actions of 
rogue groups that might otherwise escalate back 
to war
•	 prevent political abuse by one side that might 
cause actors losing the peace to take up new 
arms.
Applying this framework to the case of 
Solomon Islands, we can observe that RAMSI 
has increased both the economic and political 
incentives for peace. The restoration of government 
functions, government finances and governance 
arrangements were good in themselves and also 
boosted economic growth. This ‘peace dividend’ 
has created business opportunities for former 
militant leaders helping to keep them out of 
trouble, and political leaders have been able to 
capitalise on the improved economic performance. 
Peace has provided a number of former militant 
leaders the opportunity to become legitimate 
political actors. Several are currently members of 
parliament, and this valued status has given them 
an incentive to maintain peace and not return to 
violence.
RAMSI, as a legitimate outside party, was able 
to provide the neutral force required to convince 
the criminals and belligerents that the time for 
violence was over — a view held by the majority 
of Solomon Islanders. It was also able to remove 
and destroy most weapons, and to reassure each 
side that the other was acting in good faith. This, 
as well as their presence, reduced fear, mistrust and 
uncertainty. The speed with which the rumours 
of early April 2012 were dispelled indicates that 
there has been a reduction in (but also not an 
elimination of) fear, mistrust and uncertainty in 
communities. This, as much as the removal of 
the weapons themselves, has contributed to the 
sustainability of the peace and avoidance of a 
perceived need for weapons re-emerging.
RAMSI’s presence and sizeable development 
assistance program has helped to shift power from 
those who held weapons to those who uphold 
good governance and the rule of law. RAMSI has 
also made the resumption of conflict less likely by 
dealing with serious offences through the Solo-
mon Islands law and justice sector and, through its 
strong presence, by preventing criminal elements 
from intimidating and menacing government, 
businesses and communities in a way that might 
otherwise escalate back to the tensions period. 
By rebuilding the RSIPF and effective institutions 
in the law and justice, economic governance and 
machinery of government sectors, RAMSI has 
helped reduce the opportunity for state power to be 
systematically abused or manipulated in ways that 
make the resumption of conflict more likely. These 
civilian tasks of multidimensional peacekeeping — 
law and justice, good governance, economic man-
agement — are all aimed at establishing a system in 
which political conflict can be managed peacefully 
(Fortna 2008, 101). RAMSI’s presence has helped 
prevent misbehaviour that could become the spark 
for a more serious outbreak of violence.
A recent comparative study of peacekeeping 
missions notes that a strong predictor of the 
stability of peace is militant access to contraband 
financing (drugs, diamonds or other illicit trade). 
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Other predictors are the duration of conflict and 
the intensity of conflict. The longer the conflict 
the longer the peace, while the more deadly the 
conflict the more likely peace will falter. And the 
longer peace lasts the more likely it is to continue. 
That is, if peacekeepers can help belligerents get 
over the early, most difficult stages of avoiding 
conflict, peace takes on some momentum and 
becomes easier to maintain over time (Fortna 
2008, 117–19). Solomon Islands experienced a low-
intensity conflict (an estimated 200 fatalities over a 
five-year period) which, together with all the other 
indicators, suggests that the prospects for the peace 
of the past nine years continuing are good. 
It is against this background that the 
transition of RAMSI is underway. Transition 
refers to the changes that are planned to take 
place in RAMSI’s next phase. It is proposed that 
each of the mission’s civil, military and policing 
components will change in a different way. It 
is a process endorsed by the Solomon Islands 
Government, most recently in a November 
2011 cabinet decision. RAMSI contributing 
countries, Solomon Islands Government and the 
Pacific Islands Forum have discussed plans for 
RAMSI’s development assistance programs to be 
absorbed from 1 July 2013 into AusAID’s bilateral 
development assistance program and the programs 
of other donors; for funding for RAMSI’s PPF to 
continue for at least another four years with the 
task of building the capacity and capability of the 
RSIPF; and for the possibility of RAMSI’s military 
component leaving in the second half of 2013.
Transition — Development Assistance
RAMSI’s civilian development program is in 
three areas (referred to as ‘pillars’): Economic 
Governance, Machinery of Government, and Law 
and Justice. The pillars support the core functions 
of central agencies in the Solomon Islands 
Government, including the Ministry of Finance 
and Treasury, the Ministry of Public Service, the 
Auditor General, the Solomon Islands Electoral 
Commission, the National Judiciary, Correctional 
Services Solomon Islands, the Public Solicitor and 
the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
RAMSI’s development program support to these 
agencies has been a vital component in the country’s 
overall recovery from the tensions. The program’s 
achievements include stabilising the government’s 
budget and cash position, improving the country’s 
sovereign debt rating, and strengthening the 
parliament. Elections have been held successfully, 
the Office of the Auditor General is functioning 
after being defunct during the tensions, backlogs 
in the court system have been cut, and significant 
tension-era trials have concluded. Prisons now 
meet UN standards and prison administration 
has improved such that most advisory support to 
Corrections has been able to be withdrawn. 
RAMSI was never intended to be a long-term 
mission. Now that Solomon Islands Government 
central agencies and the law and justice sector are 
stable and functioning at a basic level, development 
activities can and should be transferred to tradition-
al donor programs that operate under time horizons 
that permit extended planning. From 1 July 2013, 
RAMSI will not be funded for this type of develop-
ment assistance and the programs will be absorbed 
into Australia’s growing bilateral aid program and 
the development assistance programs of other 
donors, including New Zealand, the EU, World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Assistance 
will support Solomon Island Government defined 
strategies in mutually agreed areas of assistance, and 
will involve a smooth transition from RAMSI to 
longer term development support mechanisms.
There are several reasons for making changes 
to RAMSI’s development assistance program. 
RAMSI has always been a short-term intervention, 
and yet assistance in areas such as law and justice 
and economic governance will be required for the 
medium- to long-term. Moving the management of 
these programs to long-term development partners 
enables longer term planning and commitment. It 
also signals that the programs have changed from 
those appropriate in a post-conflict stabilisation 
intervention to those found in a more normal 
development assistance environment. The change 
is a clear statement of the progress that has been 
made, it helps build the nation’s confidence in itself 
and it signals to foreign investors and visitors that 
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Solomon Islands is a safe place in which to do 
business and visit.
Transition in the area of development 
assistance is not an entirely new development. 
RAMSI has been learning, changing and adapting 
since 24 July 2003. For example, RAMSI’s assistance 
to Correctional Services Solomon Islands has 
already transitioned. At one point there were over 
50 RAMSI personnel working in the organisation, 
including the position of commissioner. The 
prisons were run by RAMSI officials. This is not 
the case today: Correctional Services Solomon 
Islands is headed by a Solomon Islander and there 
are now only around ten advisors, none of whom 
hold positions in the organisation. All five of the 
operating correctional centres have been rebuilt or 
refurbished and meet the UN minimum standards 
for detention of prisoners. Support to Correctional 
Services has transitioned successfully from 
intensive intervention needed in the immediate 
post-conflict period to low-key advisor support 
with budget support to ensure sustainability.
The 2011 annual performance report on 
RAMSI, conducted by an independent experts 
team, finds that the challenges under these three 
programs have been, for some time, long-term 
ones that are better addressed through broader 
development partnerships at a more realistic pace 
(AusAID 2012). Moving RAMSI’s development 
programs to bilateral aid arrangements from  
1 July 2013 will allow longer term planning and 
funding, as well as more flexible support than is 
possible under RAMSI which is constrained by the 
uncertainty of four-year budget cycles.
Transition — Policing
The Solomon Islands’ security environment has 
changed dramatically for the better since RAMSI 
arrived in 2003. Today, the security challenges 
faced by Solomon Islands are the same as those 
faced in other countries in the region. They require 
a well-run, modern police force capable of a strong 
policing response governed by a contemporary 
police act. This is where RAMSI can most effective-
ly target its capacity-building efforts during its next 
phase (2013–17).
The policing support provided by RAMSI’s 
PPF has also been transitioning for some time. 
RAMSI police have stepped back from everyday 
policing. Between August 2011 and May 2012, they 
withdrew from ten provincial police posts and are 
now concentrated in Honiara with a presence in 
Auki (Malaita Province), Gizo (Western Province) 
and Lofung (Shortland Island, Western Province). 
In Honiara, they no longer patrol the streets or 
respond to calls for assistance — these are tasks for 
the RSIPF. Instead, the role of RAMSI police is to 
train the RSIPF and provide support to its senior 
leadership. RAMSI police also maintain a public 
order management capability and can be called 
to backup the RSIPF in management of a major 
incident if required.
RAMSI police continue to support provincial 
police posts through the provision of leadership and 
mentoring programs, communications and logistics 
support, and station refurbishments. RAMSI is now 
focused on building RSIPF capabilities, especially in 
leadership development, public order management 
and the crucial logistics, human resources and 
administrative functions needed to support front-
line RSIPF officers. This transition strategy was 
developed jointly by RAMSI and the RSIPF, and 
agreed in November 2011.
Current planning is that RAMSI’s PPF, 
including police from throughout the Pacific, will 
stay in Solomon Islands and continue to support 
the RSIPF for at least another four years.
Transition — The Military
RAMSI’s military component includes soldiers 
from Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea 
and Tonga and, accordingly, is referred to within 
RAMSI as the Combined Task Force. The military 
strength has varied over the years, but since the 
elections in 2010 it has been around 170 personnel, 
comprising a company (three platoons) and a 
headquarters element. One platoon is always from 
Australia, another alternates between Australia 
and New Zealand, and the third alternates 
between Papua New Guinea and Tonga. All Pacific 
Islands countries with a military force, except 
Fiji, participate in RAMSI. Since 2007, Australia’s 
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contribution has come from the Reserve Force.
Up until the first half of 2012, there hadn’t 
been much public commentary on the continued 
presence in Solomon Islands of RAMSI’s military 
component. For many years, their role was 
twofold: to provide backup security to RAMSI’s 
police when needed, and to provide additional 
perimeter security at Rove Correctional Centre. 
They also undertook patrols across the country, but 
these ceased in October 2010. In mid-2011 they 
also ceased providing perimeter security at Rove 
Correctional Centre. The last time the Combined 
Task Force was formally called upon to assist the 
PPF to restore public order was in 2006, and it 
ceased routine joint patrols with RAMSI’s PPF in 
early 2010. Throughout, however, the military has 
been a backup capability available to support the 
PPF if required.
In early 2012, a few suggestions appeared in 
the media to the effect that it was time for RAMSI’s 
military component to leave. The reports were not 
critical of the military, which retains the support of 
the majority of the people (76 per cent of the adult 
population support the presence of the military 
(ANU Enterprise 2012, 98–99).
In a letter to the Solomon Star on 27 February  
2012, Terry Brown, the retired Anglican Bishop 
of Malaita Province, questioned the need for 
retaining a military component within RAMSI 
(Brown 2012). He acknowledged that the military 
were needed at the outset of the mission and had 
performed their role well. Now, however, he saw 
no good reason for them to stay, and argued that 
their presence may instead serve to deter visitors 
and frighten investors. He concluded that the 
withdrawal of the military would send a positive 
signal to the outside world that the country had 
stabilised.
Bishop Brown’s letter was followed on 
5 April with a full-page opinion piece in the same 
paper written by a local journalist, Robert Iroga 
(Iroga 2012). In his article, Mr Iroga said ‘perhaps 
it’s now time for Solomon Islanders to ask some 
very serious questions on whether the military 
component of RAMSI should stay or pack up and 
leave as their job is done’. He was not critical of 
RAMSI, which he described as ‘an answer to our 
prayers’, but was now concerned that the continued 
presence of the military ‘sends a wrong signal to the 
watching world’.
On 6 April 2012, this theme was echoed by 
Professor Clive Moore in an interview broadcast 
on Radio Australia (Moore et al.). Professor Moore 
said the military were unlikely to be needed in the 
near future and noted that the RSIPF had effectively 
handled the disturbances in November 2011 
surrounding the election of Prime Minister Gordon 
Darcy Lilo, without having to call on the army.
On 25 April 2012, Australia’s Minister for 
Defence, Stephen Smith, accompanied by Secretary 
of Defence Duncan Lewis, visited Solomon Islands 
and met Prime Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo. The 
visit had been planned for some time, and fol-
lowed a number of ministerial visits and visits by 
parliamentary secretaries. It should be seen in this 
context, and it would be a mistake to make some 
connection or causality between the remarks on 
the military in the media and the visit. Mr Smith 
told Radio Australia in two separate interviews 
that they had a ‘very important and substantive 
conversation’ about RAMSI’s transition (Smith 
2012). Article 3.2 of the RAMSI Treaty states that 
‘The Assisting Countries may at any time with-
draw any or all their Visiting Contingent ...’, and 
a significant withdrawal ‘will only take place after 
consultation with the Government of Solomon 
Islands’.6 Mr Smith said the time had come to start 
a conversation about the drawdown of RAMSI’s 
military component. He said they had come to a 
shared analysis that RAMSI’s focus had shifted 
to police, law and justice and public order, with a 
heavy emphasis on the training and capability of 
the RSIPF. They had come to the conclusion that 
it was now time to start talking about the orderly 
withdrawal of the military while committing to 
support policing for the foreseeable future. 
While no decisions have been made, Mr Smith 
said the withdrawal of the military would not occur  
before mid-2013. He said he had spoken to both the 
defence and foreign ministers of New Zealand, who 
had agreed that this would be the sensible thing to 
do. The next step would be to have formal dis- 
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cussions with the Pacific Islands Forum. In a Radio 
New Zealand interview on 27 April 2012,  
New Zealand’s Minister for Defence, Jonathan  
Coleman, said RAMSI’s military had ‘probably 
been there a bit longer than they really need to be’ 
and ‘longer than we intended’ (Coleman 2012).
The Forum Ministerial Standing Committee 
on RAMSI held its annual meeting in Honiara on 
18 May 2012.7 Australia was represented by Richard 
Marles, the Parliamentary Secretary for Pacific 
Island Affairs. In an interview with Australia’s 
Special Broadcasting Service following the meeting, 
he explained that a withdrawal of troops in the 
second half of 2013 would reflect the ‘radically 
different’ security environment in Solomon Islands 
and, secondly, that the guarantor of peace was now 
the police force (Marles 2012). He noted that the 
RSIPF had performed ‘admirably’ in maintaining 
public safety and public order during the protests 
at the time of the change in prime ministers in 
November 2011. He said RAMSI would continue to 
support the RSIPF ‘for many years to come’. At the 
Forum Ministerial Standing Committee, ministers 
discussed and noted the planned withdrawal of the 
military in the second half of 2013 (PIFS 2012).
Conclusion
There were proximate and underlying causes and 
key players in both the tensions and peacemaking. 
Many things have changed in the past nine years, 
but it is also true that it is not possible to eliminate 
all the factors that contributed to the tensions. 
Many of them require long-term measures 
and commitment from the Solomon Islands 
Government and civil society. A functioning law 
and justice sector, including a strongly performing 
RSIPF, and better planning and management of 
Honiara’s urbanisation are essential. Improved 
access to other government services is also 
important to alleviate feelings of social injustice 
and exclusion that are the common drivers of 
conflict worldwide. Particularly important will be 
access to universal basic education that gives every 
citizen a chance to escape the social, economic and 
political limitations of village life. In the face of 
RAMSI’s transition and drawdown, the key question 
is not whether all the proximate and underlying 
causes have been addressed, but whether there 
are incentives to maintain peace and oppose the 
resumption of violence, and how robust the critical 
institutions of the state, especially the RSIPF, are.
In future People’s Surveys, it would be useful 
to probe further the community’s attitudes to 
the RSIPF. In particular, it would be interesting 
to know the people’s views on delivery of other 
government services — such as health and 
education — to establish if there is a general 
problem with service delivery in the provinces, 
whether policing services delivered are any better 
or worse than other government services, and, as 
Solomon Islands is a low-income country with a 
very real budget constraint, if the people prefer 
any extra income to be spent on policing, schools, 
health clinics or roads.
The key to a successful transition will be the 
maintenance of confidence in both the security 
environment and management of the economy. 
Transition must not undermine confidence. 
Success to date and in the long-term is dependent 
on government, business, investors, the people 
and donors all feeling safe and able to operate 
free from intimidation. This means continued 
support from RAMSI for the development of 
capacity and capability in the RSIPF, and continued 
support through other donors for sound economic 
management and further reform. The proposed 
withdrawal of the military would also help restore 
a positive image of the security outlook among 
overseas investors and visitors, and help restore 
self-confidence among Solomon Islanders.
Transition does not mean RAMSI will be 
leaving Solomon Islands completely. Transition is 
about the next four-year phase of RAMSI to start 
on 1 July 2013. It is proposed that RAMSI’s main 
role in that phase will be to work with the RSIPF 
to strengthen its capacity and further develop it as 
a modern and effective police force. It will remain 
a partnership with the people and government 
of Solomon Islands, and a regional mission 
drawing police from all Pacific Island Forum 
countries. Close consultation with Solomon Islands 
Government, the Pacific Islands Forum and all 
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other stakeholders will remain central to the way 
RAMSI operates. 
Solomon Islands has improved greatly over the 
past nine years. Transition is the way to recognise 
these improvements. Transition is providing the 
opportunity for Solomon Islanders to step forward, 
as RAMSI steps back.
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Endnotes
1 Under the Townsville Peace Agreement (signed 15 
October 2000) the MEF and IFM agreed to renounce 
violence, forsake ethnically based complaints and 
demands and surrender weapons to an International 
Peace Monitoring Team. The Agreement also 
provided for an amnesty for members of both 
groups.
2 These incidents do not include occasions on which 
either the PPF or the Combined Task Force have 
discharged weapons in the course of duty. In 
addition to these incidents, there have also been 
numerous unconfirmed reports of weapons being 
sighted or gunshots being heard. Rumours of 
weapons stockpiles also circulate from time to time. 
3 While the official statistics indicate that Guadalcanal 
Province, including the population of Honiara, is the 
most populous province, Malaitans are the largest 
ethnic minority.
4 Unpublished survey conducted by RAMSI in early 
2012.
5 A series of soccer games between eight national 
teams.
6 Agreement Between Solomon Islands, Australia, 
New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa 
and Tonga Concerning the Operations and 
Status of the Police and Armed Forces and Other 
Personnel Deployed to Solomon Islands to Assist 
in the Restoration of Law and Order and Security. 
(Townsville, 24 July 2003). Often referred to simply 
as the ‘RAMSI Treaty’.
7 The Forum Ministerial Standing Committee on 
RAMSI was established by decision of the thirty-
seventh Pacific Islands Forum Leaders meeting in 
Nadi on 24–25 October 2006. It was established as 
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a consultation mechanism between the Government 
of Solomon Islands, RAMSI and the Pacific Islands 
Forum and involving representatives of the past, 
present and incoming Forum chairs. It is not 
involved in operational decisions but acts as a high 
level reference group, discusses the broad policy 
directions of RAMSI and progress achieved, and 
reports to Forum Leaders.
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